ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) has self -organizing mobile nodes that communicate with each other via wireless links with no infrastructure. Nodes in a MANET operate both as hosts as well as routers to forward packets to each other. MANETS are suitable for applications, in which no infrastructure exists such as military, emergency rescue and mining operations. A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of sensor nodes which are simple processing devices. The sensor nodes have the capability of sensing parameters like temperature, humidity and heat. The sensor nodes [1] communicate with each other using wireless radio devices and form a WSN. The WSN is dynamic and has a continuous changing network topology which makes routing difficult. Bandwidth and power limitations are the important resource constraints.
The authors [2] , classify the attacks on WSN as active and passive attacks. The monitoring and listening of the communication channel by unauthorized attackers are known as passive attacks. The attack against privacy is passive in nature. Some of the more common attacks against sensor privacy are monitoring and eavesdropping, traffic analysis and camouflage adversaries. If the unauthorized attackers monitor, listen and modify the data stream in the communication channel, then the attack is active attack. Routing attacks such as spoofing, replay, selective forwarding, sinkhole, sybil, wormhole, HELLO flood are active attacks. Denial of service attacks such as neglect and greed, misdirection, black hole are also active in nature.
Hoang and Uyen [3] in their study, classify the rushing, black hole, neighbor and jelly fish as the severe routing attacks in MANET. The impact of routing attacks was studied by varying the number of senders and receivers. From the results it is shown that the rushing attack causes more damage to the routing irrespective of number of senders and receivers. In case of black hole attack, if the attacker is closer to the destination heavy damage is caused to the network. According to Hoang et al a large mesh MANET has negligible damage from any type of routing attacks. Kannhavong et al [4] have handled flooding, black hole, link withholding, link spoofing, replay, wormhole and colluding misrelay attacks on Mobile ad-hoc network(MANET) routing protocols. Avinash et al [5] used a non cooperative game theory to identify black hole nodes and proposed a new Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol for Mobile Ad-hoc network (MANET). Jorge et al [6] used watchdog and Bayesian filters to detect black hole attack by means of which malicious nodes are identified in MANET. Anoosha et al [7] identified black holes using honey pot agents. This roaming software agent performs a network tour and identifies the malicious node through route request advertisements and maintains intrusion logs. Kai et al [8] proposed a energy efficient, denial of service (DoS) and flooding attack resistant routing protocol using ant colony optimization. In this algorithm every node has a trust value. Faithful forwarding nodes are selected based on the remaining energy and trust value. Guoxing et al [9] proposed a trust aware secure multi-hop routing protocol for WSN. The trust values are calculated by exploiting the replay of routing information by which all the malicious nodes are dropped from routing decisions. In the previous work [13] a TESLA based secure route discovery is suggested for MAODV. The sybil and wormhole attack [16] is investigated in GMR for WSN. It is found that wormhole attack does more damage than sybil attack on the routing procedure. This paper simulates the black hole and rushing attack in Geographic Multicast Routing (GMR). The simulation was carried out using NS-2 and the network performance is studied with and without black hole and rushing attack in the WSN and a comparison is made with MANET based on the study of Hoang et al [3] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, describes the Geographic Multicast Routing protocol (GMR). Section 3 describes the rushing attack. Section 4 describes the black hole attack. Section 5 describes the simulation environment and analyses the performance of the network in the presence and absence of black hole and rushing attack and section 6 concludes the work.
GEOGRAPHIC MULTICAST ROUTING PROTOCOL
Depending on the network structure, routing in WSNs can be divided into flat-based routing, hierarchical-based routing and location-based routing algorithm. Sensor protocols for information via negotiation (SPIN), directed diffusion and rumor routing are some of the flatbased routing algorithms. Low energy adaptive cluster hierarchy (LEACH), leach centralized (LEACH-C), power efficient gathering in sensor information system (PEGASIS) are the hierarchical routing protocols.
Sancez et al [10] proposed an energy efficient routing protocol for WSN called Geographic Multicast Routing Protocol (GMR) which is one of the location based protocol. The GMR protocol calculates the position of the sensor nodes from Global Positioning System (GPS) [11] or it can use the virtual co-ordinates. Each sensor node communicates its position to its neighbors using periodic beacons. GMR forms a multicast tree to send a data packet from a source to multiple destinations using a single broad cast transmission.
In GMR [10], each forwarding node selects a subset of its neighbors in the direction of the destination as relay nodes based on cost over progress ratio. The cost is equal to the number of selected neighbors. Progress is the reduction of the remaining distances to the destinations. The cost over progress metric is explained with respect to Figure 1 . The remote source node S multicasts the message M to a set of destinations {D1, D2, D3, D4, D5}. The forwarding node C receives the message M from the source S and uses its neighbours A 1 and A 2 as the relay nodes. In GMR, the multicasting task could be given to one neighbor or it could be handled by several neighbors. Each neighbor could address a set of destinations.
Figure 1 GMR -Neighbor Selection
From node C the total distance for multicasting is T 1 as given in equation (1) . Then the node C applies greedy partitioning algorithm and selects A 1 as the relay node responsible for D 1 , D 2 and D 3. The node A 2 is chosen as the relay node for D 4 and D 5. For the next level of the multicast tree a new total distance T 2 is calculated as given in equation (2) . The progress is the difference between T 1 and T 2 as given in equation (3) . The cost over progress ratio (P i ) for the new forwarding set {A 1, A 2 } is 2/ T 1 -T 2. The node C informs its neighbors that they are selected as the relay nodes through the header, given in Figure 2 . The GMR adds this header to the data message.
In Figure 2 , the first field is the node, namely node C, which applies the greedy partitioning algorithm. The next field is the first relay node A 1 and the set of destinations it has to handle {D 1, D 2 ,D 3 }. The third field is the second relay node, A 2 and the set of destinations {D 4, D 5 }.
Thus the sender broadcasts a single message and it reaches the destination by selective forwarding. Hence, energy and bandwidth consumption are minimized.
RUSHING ATTACK IN GMR
Rushing attack [3] is a kind of denial of service attack. When the source node floods the network with route discovery packets to find routes to the destinations, each intermediate node processes only the first non-duplicate packet and discards the other duplicate packets that arrive
at a later time. A rushing attacker exploits this duplicate suppression mechanism by quickly forwarding route discovery packets in order to gain access to the forwarding group.
This paper studies the rushing attack in terms of its effect on the operation of GMR. In this implementation the GMR is implemented with a source node(C) that initiates a data message to 20 destinations. The malicious nodes are uniformly distributed throughout the network. The cost over progress ratio is calculated. In this simulation, rushing attack is introduced by setting data packets processing delay time to 10 ms for all the good nodes. For rushing nodes (M) the processing delay time is set to zero. Therefore, node M i is chosen as the forwarding node by the Greedy partitioning algorithm of GMR [10]. The malicious node M i is chosen as the relay node since it has the best cost over progress ratio. From this experimentation, it has been found that the introduced malicious nodes will be selected as the forwarding nodes. Figure 3 is the pseudo code of rushing attack in GMR. 
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BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN GMR
When all the messages are redirected to a specific node, it is defined as black hole attack [12] . The node could be the malicious node. The traffic migrates into that malicious node. The node would not exist after a black hole attack. A black hole attack has two stages. In the first stage, the black hole exploits the routing protocol to advertise itself as having a valid route to the destination, even though the route is spurious. In the second stage, the node consumes the intercepted packets and suddenly disappears. This paper implements the black hole attack in GMR protocol using the pseudo code given in Figure 4 . A set of malicious nodes(M) with the processing delay of 0 ms is launched and normal nodes are set with a processing delay of 10 ms. The black hole node advertises its ID and location information to its one hop neighbor by a beacon message. Then, GMR partition algorithm is executed. Since, black hole nodes has less processing delay and hence best cost over progress ratio (COP) they are selected as the relay nodes. In our implementation only 6 nodes were selected as the forwarding nodes in the first iteration. So, the loop is repeated until all the 10 malicious nodes are selected as the forwarding nodes in the multicast tree. At 100 ms of simulation time, the malicious node starts dropping the packets. When 200ms is reached the energy is set to zero. So, the black hole node disappears from the multicast tree. Figure 5 is a example of black hole attack and Figure 6 is the data header format. 
BLACKHOLE( M: set of Malicious
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks, the GMR is simulated using NS-2 [13, 14] . The goal of the evaluation is to test the effectiveness of the black hole and rushing attack variations under normal conditions. The size of data payload is 512 bytes. This simulation, Table 1 is the simulation parameters. Table 2 is the obtained mean values of network performance under no attack, black hole attack and rushing attack. The number of malicious nodes was varied from 2 to 10 and the results are compared with previous work [3] . The network performance is evaluated using packet delivery ratio (PDR), network throughput (NTh), packet drop ratio (PDrR), end to end delay (EED) and energy loss metrics in the presence of black hole and rushing attack. 
Performance Analysis
The performance of the network is studied by analyzing packet delivery ratio(PDR), network throughput(NTh), packet drop ratio(PDrR), end to end delay(EED) and energy loss.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR)
Packet Delivery Ratio is defined as the ratio of the total number of data packets received by the destination node to the number of data packets sent by the source node as given in equation (4) . Figure 7 represents the packet delivery ratio measured for the GMR protocol. The packet delivery ratio dramatically decreases in the presence of malicious node in the network. The mean packet delivery ratio is 80% when there is no attack. Due to the black hole attack, the mean packet delivery ratio decreases to 53 %. In case of rushing attack, the mean PDR decreases to 69% because of fast message forwarding. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) = ∑ of packets received by the destination node (4) ∑of packets sent by the source node Network Throughput (NTh) = ∑ of packets generated by source node (5) ∑of packets received at the destination Packet Drop Ratio (PDrR) = ∑ of packets dropped by the network (6) ∑of packets generated by the network
Network Throughput (NTh)
The network throughput (NTh) represents the numbers of data packets generated by the source node to the number of data packets received in the destination as given in formula (5). In Figure  8 , the mean throughput of the network is 67% when there is no attack. For rushing attack, the malicious agent is launched at 100 ms and floods data packets to all its neighbors. As a result, the mean throughput is reduced to 53%. In case of black hole attack, the malicious node which is activated at 100 ms starts dropping the packets. Hence, the throughput regularly drops by 10% and the mean throughput decreases to 42% for black hole attack. From Figure 8 , the throughput is high in the absence of attack. 
Packet drop ratio (PDrR)
Packet drop ratio is the average number of packets dropped by the network to number of packets generated by the network as given in equation (6) . Figure 9 is packet drop ratio in case of rushing and black hole attack. From Figure 9 for rushing attack, there is a packet loss between 50 ms to 120 ms because, the malicious node floods the data packets to all its neighbors in the next 70 ms. Rushing attack has a uniform packet loss after 120 ms. The packets dropped in the network is more for black hole than rushing attack. From Figure 10 the energy loss is uniform in case of no attack. The network drops its energy by two joule form 60 ms to 150 ms for rushing attack. In the next 30 ms rushing attack lost one joule and black hole attack losses two joules in next 50 ms. At 210 ms of simulation, the energy loss drops to 0.5 joules because of sudden disappearance of black hole nodes. implementation. In WSN the rushing attack has 57% average PDR for two malicious nodes and if the malicious node increases to 10 nodes the PDR drops to 37%. But for MANET mesh network PDR drops to 20% for ten attackers. In case of black hole attack PDR varies from 47% to 18% in WSN. In case of MANET in the presence of black hole, the PDR is down to16%. Figure 12 shows the average network delay for MANET and WSN. The average network delay of rushing attack for WSN remains the same irrespective of the number of malicious nodes. For MANET delay is 40% in the presence of two malicious node and remains at 48% when the no a tta ck Blackhole Rushing number of malicious nodes is 8 and more. The black hole attack produces 61% and 52% delay for WSN and MANET respectively. Figure 12 . Comparison of Average Network Delay Figure 13 is the average energy consumed by the rushing and black hole attack for the implemented WSN and the existing MANET. The battery power of sensor node is highly valuable resource which has to be used efficiently. For WSN the black hole node takes 89% of 5 joules and rushing attack consumes 35% of power. The black hole attack and replay attack for MANET takes 70% and 33% of total energy. Figure 14 shows the average energy loss of the network for varying number of malicious nodes. The average energy loss of the network is approximately same for WSN and MANET when the malicious node is two. When the strength of the malicious node increases to ten, the energy loss of the WSN and MANET for black hole attack is 84% and 89% respectively. The energy loss curve of the WSN is linear.
CONCLUSION
With the developments in WSN environments, the services based on WSN have increased. In this paper, the effect of black hole and rushing attack on GMR protocol has been studied. The packet delivery ratio, throughput, end-to-end delay and energy loss has been evaluated. There is reduction in packet delivery ratio, throughput and end to end delay as observed from the graphs. In black hole attack, all network traffics are redirected to a specific node or from the malicious node causing serious damage to GMR protocol. In rushing attack because of lengthier transmission queue in each node the performance of the network is degraded. From the performance metrics it is understood that the black hole is a severe routing attack for WSN. The behavior of rushing attack is almost same for WSN and MANET and affects the routing protocol. 
